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In this note we show how to get consistency for first order 
classical logic, in a purely syntactic way, without going through 
cut elimination. The procedure is very simple and it uses the 
calculus of structures [WS] in an interesting way. It also shows how 
finitariness (in the sense of finite choice of premises for each 
rule) is actually a triviality (contrarily to what one would guess 
from textbooks). 
 
We all know that Gödel's incompleteness forbids easy solutions for 
very expressive cases, so this method can't be a magic bullet for 
the foundations of mathematics. Nonetheless, there are two points 
that we believe are worthy: 
 
1) The method is general and could be helpful for easy checking of 
consistency in other cases. 
 
2) It makes clear that there is no deep connection between cut 
elimination and finitariness, as entailed by the subformula property 
(which in turn entails consistency). This is folklore for the 
sequent calculus, but in the case of the calculus of structures the 
construction is more perspicuous. 
 
First we give a general summary of the steps involved, for a generic 
logic; then we get into the details for classical logic. 
 
 
Consistency in Four Easy Steps 
 
Step 1 
 
Write your logic in the calculus of structures, making sure that the 
rules are defined according to our recipe [AG1]. This ensures that 
the cut rule can trivially be replaced by a cut rule in atomic form. 
Then, you have the atomic cut rule, which is 
 
         S(a,¬a) 
      ai------- . 
          S{} 
 
where  is the unit for disjunction. 
 
(In the sequent calculus, the cut rule cannot trivially be 
restricted to atomic form. You'd have to go through full-blown cut 
elimination.) 2 
Step 2 
 
Replace ai by fai (finitary cut, see [AG2]), which is: 
 
          S(a,¬a) 
      fai-------   where a or ¬a appears in S{ }. 
           S{} 
 
Provability is not affected by this substitution: proving this claim 
is almost trivial, and it probably always is for every system (look 
at the proof below for classical logic). 
 
This means that you get a system that proves the same logic, but all 
its rules can only be applied in a finite number of different ways: 
the equivalent of a subformula property.  
 
This is a weak form of cut elimination: you only eliminate certain 
cuts, those that introduce atoms that have nothing to do with 
the conclusion of the proof. Doing this does not require going 
through each and every mutual relation of rules in the system. 
 
Step 3 
 
Prove that falsehood, or empty, or any given structure, can not be 
proved. This is consistency in a weak form, if you like. This is 
very easy for classical logic and BV [AG3]. We guess it's the same 
for other systems. 
 
Step 4 
 
Prove a stronger form of consistency, like: you can't have a proof 
of R and another of ¬R at the same time. There is a nice easy trick 
for doing this in the calculus of structures, given `weak´ 
consistency. 
 
* * * 
 
At this point you're done. Of course, you still can perform the 
equivalent of cut elimination in the sequent calculus.  
 
 
Consistency for Propositional Classical Logic 
 
We apply the procedure above to classical propositional logic. We 
refer here to systems in [BT], reproduced below for convenience. 
 
Step 1 
 
Classical logic in the calculus of structures: here is a 
presentation with atomic interaction rules and non-atomic 
contraction and weakening. Things work the same for the entirely 
atomic presentation. 
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1)  Language: 
 
1)  R, T and U stand for generic structures; 
2)  a is an atom, which is a structure; 
3)  f and t are structures, but not atoms; f stands for the unit 
`false´, t stands for the unit `true´; 
4)  [R
1,…,R
h] and (R
1,…,R
h) are structures, for n > 0; [R,T] stands 
for R  T, (R,T) stands for R  T; 
5)  the structure ¬R is the negation of R; 
6)  S{ } is a structure with a hole that does not occur inside a 
negation; 
7)  S[R,T] and S(R,T) are shortcuts of S{[R,T]} and S{(R,T)}, 
respectively; 
 
2) Equations: 
 
Structures are considered equivalent modulo =, so defined: 
1)  associativity and commutativity of […] and (…): e.g., 
[((a,b),c),d] = [d,(a,c,b)]; 
2) De Morgan: e.g., ¬[a,(b,c)] = (¬a,[¬b,¬c]). 
3)  units: [t,t] = t;   [f,R] = R; 
             (f,f) = f;   (t,R) = R. 
 
3) Rules: 
 
1)  Interaction:           S{t}        S(a,¬a) 
                  ai-------   ai------- 
                     S[a,¬a]       S{f} 
 
2)  Core:                     S([R,U],T) 
                        s---------- 
                         S[(R,T),U] 
 
3)  Non-core:              S[R,R]       S{R} 
                    c------    c------ 
                       S{R}       S(R,R) 
 
                       S{f}        S{R} 
                     w----      w---- 
                       S{R}        S{t} 
 
A proof of R is a chain of rule instances whose premise is t and 
conclusion is R, denoted by 
 
      t 
      | . 
      R 
 
Step 2 
 
The rules ai and w are non-finitary, since, given a conclusion, 
they yield infinitely many premises. Being non-core, w can 
immediately be eliminated by using a generic cut and w: 4 
        S(R,[t,f]) = S{R} 
       s----------- 
        S[t,(R,f)]  
      w----------- 
        S[t,(R,¬R)] 
      i----------- . 
           S{t} 
 
Generic cuts can be reduced to atomic cuts by recursively applying 
 
         S(R,T,[-R,-T]) 
       s---------------- 
        S(R,[-R,(T,-T)]) 
      i---------------- 
            S(R,-R) 
          i------- . 
             S{f} 
 
So, the only infinitary rule we are left with is ai. How do we get 
rid of it in case we have a proof? 
 
Consider the rule 
 
          S(a,¬a) 
      fai-------   where a or ¬a appears in S{ }. 
           S{} 
 
This rule is finitary, and we're going to show that, given a proof 
of R, we can always get a proof of R where no ai appears, but the 
only cuts that appear are fai instances. 
 
Take a proof of R and individuate the bottommost instance of ai 
that violates the proviso, as in: 
 
            t 
            | 
         S(a,¬a) 
      ai------- , 
          S{f} 
            | 
            R 
 
where neither a nor ¬a appear in S{ }. We can then replace all 
occurrences of a and ¬a in the subproof above S{f} with t and f, 
respectively, and we still have a proof of R. All rule instances 
stay valid or become trivial, for example  
 
         S{t}              S(t,f) 
    ai ------   and   ai ------ , 
        S[t,f]              S{f} 
 
can just be removed, since t = [t,f] and (t,f) = f.  5 
Please notice that if a or ¬a appeared in S{ }, this would not 
work, because it could destroy the derivation from S{f} to R. 
 
Proceeding inductively upwards, we remove all infinitary atomic 
cuts. 
 
Step 3 
 
We have to show that there is no proof 
 
      t 
      | . 
      f 
 
After having done Step 2, we know that we can restrict ourselves to 
the finitary case, which means that we just have to show that there 
is no such proof when no atom appears in the proof. So, only f and t 
can appear in the proof, and we essentially have to look at the 
units' equations. 
 
Let us call `boolean structure´ any structure freely made from f and 
t by [_,_] and (_,_). It's easy to show that f is not equal to t. 
Then we just have to show that no rule, when applied to a boolean 
structure, has premise t and conclusion f. This is simply done by 
inspection of all rules, which means inspection of s, c and w. 
Easy case analysis. 
 
Step 4 
 
We want to prove that if R is provable, then ¬R is not provable. 
The following flipping construction is not possible in the sequent 
calculus. 
 
Take 
 
      t 
      | 
      R 
 
and flip it, by negating everything and using the corules for every 
rule instance (for this we need the entire system above), to get  
 
      ¬R 
       | . 
       f 
 
If ¬R were provable we could then prove f, which is absurd. 
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Consistency for Predicate Classical Logic 
 
We only sketch the argument, by noting the differences with respect 
to the propositional case; see [BT] for details of the predicate 
system.  
 
We eliminate all those instances of atomic cut, 
 
         S(p(t
1,...,t
h),¬p(t
1,...,t
h)) 
      ai--------------------------- , 
                     S{f} 
 
in which predicate symbol p does not occur in S. 
 
This is done in the same way as in the propositional case. We 
replace all occurrences of instances of p(t
1,...,t
h) by t and of 
¬p(t
1,...,t
h) by f. This works because the only extra rules in the 
predicate case that care about atoms are: 
 
1) the equation 
 
      x.R = x.R = R   if x is not free in R; 
 
2) the rule 
 
        S{R[xt]} 
      n---------- . 
         S{x.R} 
 
Instances of both of them are still valid if t or f replaces 
arbitrary atoms in R. 
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